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Bribe chains arise when a hierarchy of corruptible auditors audits taxpayers.  We investigate 
fine and reward structures for breaking bribe chains and establishing income-revealing 
equilibria. We show that no super-auditing is necessary in one-off audits if auditors' rewards 
are related to the amount of tax evasion detected by them. However, such equilibria do not 
survive repeated encounters, even with super-audits. We then show that if rewards are based 
on tax collection, income-revealing equilibria can be sustained over repeated encounters. In 
such structures, the number of levels in the hierarchy is immaterial for income revelation as 
such, but it determines the net revenue of the government. 
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In the early literature on tax evasion, policy implications were generally based on the 
comparison of gains from evasion with expected penalty costs (Allingham and Sandmo, 
1972;  Srinivasan, 1973).  However, imposing an expected penalty cost on an offending 
taxpayer involves positive resource expenditure by the revenue authority. This latter cost 
increases significantly if the revenue administration is corrupt. A corrupt administration leads 
to collusion between taxpayers and auditors making detection highly costly1.  
 
Collusion in tax administration has been noted as a problem even in pre-modern 
administrations. Some economic historians believe that the practice of auctioning off the tax 
office in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe and variants of this practice in the 
Ottoman, Mughal, Quajar and Manchu empires was a response to collusion between 
taxpayers and collectors (Braudel, 1983, pp 540-542; Swart1980, and Theobald, 1990, pp 27-
29). In the context of modern tax administrations, two suggestions are made to resolve this 
problem. The first, the auditing of officials by an external agency, is practiced in many 
countries today and is often thought to be the most potent remedy against bureaucratic 
corruption (Palmier, 1983). However, the more successful examples of external auditing 
come from public services outside of tax administrations2. The second suggestion is 
departmental or hierarchical auditing of auditors; our paper is concerned with this procedure.  
The generic problem of monitoring a corrupt agent by a supervisor has been explored in Bac 
(1996a, 1996b) and Bag (1997).  In the context of tax administration, Chander and Wilde 
(1992) analyzed a model with corrupt auditors under a team of super-auditors. However, if 
corruption is widespread, super-auditors are likely to be corruptible so that the collusion 
between taxpayers and auditors may extend through the higher levels in the audit hierarchy. 
Examples of such collusive chains along a supervisory hierarchy are fairly common and have 
been discussed in the literature3. Modelling the problem with a single level of super-auditors 
appears ad hoc unless we can argue that it generates the best payoff for the principal. Two 
obvious questions arise. Is hierarchical monitoring or audit necessary at all for revealing 
                                                     
1 For  theoretical work on the implications of collusion, see Virmani (1987), Chu (1990), Goswami, Sanyal and Gang 
(1991), Chander and Wilde (1992), Sanyal, Gang and Goswami (forthcoming). For empirical evidence of the extent of 
collusion in tax administrations, see Chu (1990), the Policy Group (1985), Acharya (1986). 
2 The most successful example cited in the literature is that of the breaking up of syndicated corruption in police 
administration in Hong Kong by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) established in 1974. For details, 
see Palmier (1983). The record of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), a similar agency in India, is not as spectacular. 
The number of convictions of corrupt public servants has trailed far behind the rate at which corruption has allegedly grown. 
See Theobald (1990), pp 140-41, and also Guardian Weekly, January 10, 1988. 
3 For an interesting account of chains of corruption and bribes, see Wade (1988), and The Policy Group (1985). 
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private information? Is there an optimal level of hierarchy that generates the best payoff for 
the principal? 
 
We address both issues in the context of income tax evasion. We analyze a model of taxpayers 
audited by a hierarchy of auditors, using a construction similar to that developed in Basu, 
Bhattacharya and Mishra (1992). Such structures are shown to sustain bribe chains, formally 
defined below, from taxpayers to the highest audit level. We then explore possible reward 
schemes that may induce income-revealing equilibria by snapping the bribe chain. We show 
that, if rewards are related to the evasion detected by an auditor, no hierarchy is necessary for 
income revelation in one-off audits, i.e., a single layer is sufficient. However, we argue that this 
mechanism can not be sustained under repeated encounters between taxpayers and auditors. 
The practical problem of tax evasion, auditing and corruption relates to repeated year after year 
encounters between taxpayers and auditors and this problem has to be analyzed in that 
institutional context.  
 
Turning to repeated encounters, we show that no level of hierarchy, however large, can sustain 
truth-revealing equilibria, if rewards are related to the detection of evasion. Such mechanisms 
are very likely to be undermined by collusion between taxpayers and the entire audit hierarchy. 
We then try to model an alternative mechanism that can sustain revelation in repeated 
encounters. We try to establish several propositions in this connection. First, rewards dependent 
on tax collection can sustain income-revealing equilibria in repeated encounters. Secondly, we 
show that the number of levels in the hierarchy is not important to the elimination of bribe 
chains. At the same time, the analysis brings out an important role of hierarchy. We show that 
the authorities can concentrate the rewards in the highest level of the hierarchy. Given that 
hierarchies are pyramidal, reward money payed out for chain breaking is smaller if the 
hierarchy contains more levels4. Finally, this gain from increasing the number of levels is 
weighed against the marginal cost of setting up an extra layer of audit; we derive the conditions 
for an optimal level of audit hierarchy.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model of hierarchical audit and bribe 
chains. It then proposes a fine and reward scheme that can produce income-revealing 
equilibrium in single encounters. Section 3 constructs a repeated game to indicate that the 
above scheme is likely to be undermined by collusion between taxpayers and the audit 
                                                     
4 This result supports the observation made in Basu, Bhattacharya and Mishra (1992) that a small reward can stop a large 
revenue leak because individuals in a chain get only a fraction of total bribes. 
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hierarchy if there are repeated tax returns and audit decisions. Section 4 looks at the problem 
from an optimal mechanism design perspective. Using the results of that literature, we present 
some intuition about a possible design that might work. Section 5 uses this intuition to develop 
a mechanism that can sustain income revelation in repeated games. Section 6 explores the 
conditions of the existence of an optimal level of hierarchy in that mechanism. Finally, section 
7 contains some concluding observations. 
 
 
2.  A Model of Hierarchical Audit and Bribe Chains 
 
This section develops a model of hierarchical audit, characterizes bribe chains, and examines 
a possible structure of fines and rewards that can generate income-revealing equilibrium. 
Consider an audit hierarchy in which taxpayers are audited by a group of auditors, who are in 
turn audited hierarchically by another group and so on.  Make the following assumptions: 
 
(1) There are m levels of audit.  
(2)  Let p1 denote the probability that a taxpayer is audited, p2 that a level 1 auditor 
is audited , ..... , and pm that the (m-1) level auditor is audited, 0 < pi ≤ 1,  for 
all i. 
(3)  Let f2 denote the proportional fine rate for first level auditors, f3 that for the 
second level,  ….. ,  and  fm that for the (m-1)th level. These rates apply to the 
amount of undisclosed income an auditor has been caught condoning. For 
symmetry of notation, we denote by f1 the rate of tax plus fine, or t + F , to be 
levied on a taxpayer’s undisclosed income, if he is caught evading5. 
(4)  The highest, i.e., the mth level, is not monitored. Instead these authorities are 
offered a reward if they detect dishonest reporting at lower levels. The reward 
is proportional to the income involved in the offense. The reward rate is R>0.  
(5)  Auditors at all levels are potentially corrupt.  
(6)  Auditors and taxpayers act honestly if they are indifferent between cheating 
and honest action.  
(7)  All auditors and taxpayers are risk neutral.  
                                                     
5 If we use a nonlinear penalty function, the Nash solution discussed below, is difficult to characterize.  In the most general 
case, doubts arise about using the Nash solution, which was developed for convex feasible sets.  See Basu, Bhattacharya and 
Mishra (1992) and Anant, Basu, and Mukherji (1990). 
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(8)  In negotiations, possible fines and rewards alone describe potential losses or 
gains. There is no hidden asymmetry in the bargaining position of any agent. 
(9)  The proportional tax rate, t, is fixed by fiscal authorities, while the revenue 
administration can choose audit probabilities, pi  (i = 1,2,...,m), fine rates fi (i 
= 1,2,...,m), and the reward rate  R. Thus, the revenue administration chooses 
(2m + 1) variables. 
 
The decisions of taxpayers and auditors constitute an (m +1)-stage game, with stages denoted 
by 0 to m. Stage 0 comprises the no action strategy for all players except taxpayers, who 
decide to either evade taxes or not evade. In stage 1 all players, except the taxpayers and level 
1 auditors, have the no action strategy. Furthermore, if taxpayers had played not evade in 
stage 0, they and the auditors at level 1 have the no action strategy. Otherwise, the taxpayers’ 
strategy is to collude, while the auditors’ strategy is to either report or collude. The report 
strategy is simply to report the offense. Collude is taken to mean accept the Nash bargain 
solution value of bribe, if it exceeds the reservation level payoff. 
 
In stage 2, all players, except level 1 and level 2 auditors, have the no action strategy. If level 
1 auditors had played report in stage 1, they and the level 2 auditors have a singleton strategy, 
no action. Otherwise level 1 plays collude, while level 2 auditors can either report or collude. 
Continuing similarly, in stage m, all players except auditors of level (m-1) and m have the no 
action strategy. If (m-1) level auditors had played report in stage (m-1), both groups of 
auditors have a singleton strategy of no action. Otherwise the (m-1) level auditors collude, 
while m level auditors can play either report or collude. The game tree is shown in figure 1.  
We define a bribe chain as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game in which taxpayers 
evade taxes and auditors at all levels earn positive bribes.  In figure 1, the strategy profile 
(evade, collude, collude,…, collude) joining the nodes numbered 0 to m along the extreme 
left of the diagram would comprise a bribe chain, if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium. We 
first show that this profile is a bribe chain under some configuration of parameters. 
 
Consider the subgame at the node m. The m-level auditor has detected that an auditor at (m-1) 
level had condoned tax evasion involving, say, an amount Z. If there is a bribe negotiation 
between the two, and bm is the proportional bribe rate, the gain from successful negotiation of 
the m level auditor is (bm - R)Z, while that of the (m-1) level auditor is  (fm - bm )Z. The Nash 
bargaining solution would  set bm  so that it  maximizes the product of the gains of the two 
sides, [(bm - R)Z].[(fm - bm )Z]. This gives: 
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 bm = (fm +R)/2         (1) 
 
Assume that the parameters are such that bm is better than the reservation level for both 
parties, so that the bargain is struck. 
 
Next consider the subgame at the node (m-1). An (m-1) level auditor, having caught an erring 
auditor at (m-2) level, is engaged in bribe negotiation. In this subgame, the (m-1) level auditor 
predicts bm as given by (1) and uses it for calculating her payoff. Gains on successful 
negotiation of the two sides are respectively, (bm-1- pm.bm) and (fm-1 – bm-1). The solution value 
of bm-1 is obtained as earlier to give: 
 
 bm-1 =  (fm-1 + pmbm ) / 2       (2) 
 
Using similar backward induction, we have in general: 
 
 bi  = (fi  + pi +1b i+1 )/2  for i =2 to (m-1)     (3) 
 
Now consider the bribe negotiation between an errant taxpayer and a level 1 auditor. It 
maximizes: 
 
[(f1 - b1 )Z].[(b1 -p2 b2 )] Z and yields b1 = (f1 + p2 b2)/2.    (4) 
 
Finally consider a taxpayer’s decision about tax evasion. Given her income Y, she chooses an 
evasion Z to minimize t(Y-Z) + p1b1Z. Taxpayers predict b1 and assuming: 
 
  t> p1b1 and f1>b1        (5)  
 
the solution is Z =Y. 
 
Equation (5) is a necessary condition for taxpayers to under-report their income with the pre-
meditated plan that they would bribe the auditor if tax evasion is detected. Similarly, 
necessary conditions for bribe bargains to be struck at each stage are that the bribe rates 
defined in (3) and (4) be higher than the reservation pay offs of both sides in the 
corresponding stages. They require the following inequalities: 
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fm > R          (6) 
fm-1 > pm R         (7) 
fm-2 > pm-1 pm R        (8) 
… … … 
f1 > p2 p3 p4........ pm-1 pm R,       (9) 
 
Also using these inequalities, condition (5) can be re-written as: 
 
 t> p1 f1          (10) 
 
If inequalities (6) through (10) are satisfied, the strategy profile (evade, collude, collude,…, 
collude) joining the nodes numbered 0 to m along the extreme left of figure 1 is a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. No player can gain by deviating from this profile in a single stage and 
conforming to it thereafter. This leads us to posit the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: A bribe chain exists if inequalities (6) through (10) are satisfied. 
Proposition 1 motivates a simple suggestion for stopping a bribe chain by disabling these 
inequalities by setting: 
 
fm = R          (11) 
 fm-1 = pm R         (12) 
 fm-2 = pm-1 pm R        (13) 
 … … … 
 f1 = p2 p3 p4........ pm-1 pm R,       (14) 
 t= p1 f1          (15) 
 
By assumption, a tie between cheating and honest action leads to the latter. So (15) would 
guarantee that a taxpayer would pay taxes rather than evade and pay fines. She may still find 
evasion and bribing a possible alternative; however, this action is precluded by the rest of the 
conditions. Condition (11) ensures that m-level auditors would not take bribes. This would 
mean that (m-1) level auditors would take a bribe from below only if it is larger than expected 
fines to be paid if caught. Conditions (11) and (12) together prevent this. The argument 
continues down to auditors at level 1, who would also refuse bribes.  
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Since the revenue administration can choose (2m +1) variables, which are constrained by the  
(m + 1) relations (11) through (15), it has m degrees of freedom left. Without any loss of 
generality, the administration can choose m audit probabilities pi. Audit probabilities are real 
numbers in the closed interval between zero and one. Adding the reasonable restriction that 
all fi and R have to be finite, the authorities can choose pi, for all i, from the half-open interval 
(0, 1] and then solve (11) to (15) for fi’s and R. 
 
Proposition 2: Income-revealing equilibria can be generated by any value of m ≥1.  
The proof is obvious in view of the fact that constraints (11) to (15) always leave enough 
degrees of freedom to choose pi ( i = 1, 2,.., m),  for all values of m ≥1. As an illustration, 
consider m =1. Then {f1 = t / p1, R = f1 and any p in 0 < p ≤ 1} ensures income-revealing 
equilibrium. This proposition implies that hierarchical auditing is superfluous for the purpose 
of income-revelation alone. In fact, if the marginal cost of an additional level of auditing is 
positive, hierarchical audits are wasteful and m =1 is optimal for net revenue. 
 
 
3. Repeated Encounters and Collusion 
 
The structure of fines and rewards discussed above works if there is a single audit encounter. 
However, if the game is repeated indefinitely and the truth-revealing equilibrium is 
established each time, no taxpayer ever cheats and no auditor at levels 1 to (m-1) misreports. 
Hence, auditors at the m level never get a reward either and income of m level auditors is 
perpetually lower than in the bribe chain. Intuitively, the m level auditors could increase their 
average discounted pay off by encouraging cheating and extracting some bribe. The 
requirement for a cheating equilibrium to reappear is that the m level auditors simply ignore 
the reward, R.  By convincing subordinates at level (m-1) that they are willing to accept some 
rate of bribe bm < R = fm, they can make it feasible for the latter to take bribes from the (m-2) 
level and so on down the hierarchy. Since payoffs for all auditors and taxpayers are higher in 
a cheating equilibrium, all players are expected to cooperate. The present section develops 
this intuition by repeating the game of section 2. 
 
Consider first the subgame starting at node m, where the (m-1) level auditor can play either  
collude, or no action, and the m-level auditor can play collude, report or no action. If the (m-
1) level auditor plays no action, the m-level auditor plays no action. If the (m-1) level auditor 
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plays collude, the m-level auditor has two strategies, either collude or report. We now 
redefine collude for the m-level auditor to mean settling for some bribe rate bm < R = fm6. The 
payoffs for the (m-1) and m level auditors respectively are: (0,0) to the profile report, no 
action; (-fm , R) to collude, report; and (-bm, bm) to collude, collude.  
 
Suppose that this game is repeated infinitely often and let δ denote the common discount 
factor for both players. Consider the following strategy profile: 
 
(m-1) level auditor: collude until the m level auditor plays report; no action for all time 
afterwards. 
m-level auditor: collude if the (m-1) level auditor plays collude in the current stage 
game; no action otherwise. 
 
For any bm > R (1- δ  ), this profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium for the game beginning 
at node m and repeated infinitely. 
 
If this is known at the node (m-1), the following profile emerges as the subgame perfect 
equilibrium for the proper subgame starting at (m-1): 
 
(m-2) level auditor: collude until the (m-1) level auditor plays report; no action for all 
time afterwards. 
(m-1) level auditor: collude until the m-level auditor plays report; no action for all time 
afterwards. 
m-level auditor: collude if the (m-1) level auditor plays collude in the present stage 
game; no action otherwise. 
 
This induction can be continued backwards to the taxpayer and, for the game starting at node 
0, we have (evade, collude, collude, …., collude) as the subgame perfect equilibrium in 
indefinitely repeated encounters. Although we can not characterize the value of bm and the 
related values bi , i = 1,.., (m-1), it appears likely that a bribe chain will be established with R 
> bm > R (1-δ) from the above arguments. 
 
 
                                                     
6 We can not characterize the values of this bribe rate, nor is it necessary for the argument at hand. 
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4. An Optimal Mechanism Design Perspective  
 
The mechanism suggested in section 2 fails because collusion would undermine it in the long 
run. We explore a possible alternative that might withstand this tendency for collusion by 
considering an optimal mechanism design problem. For simplicity, if we assume that there is 
only one level of audit, we have three parties in the problem. Also suppose there is a single 
taxpayer and a single auditor7. 
 
Parties are characterized by the following attributes. The taxpayer’s income, Y, is her private 
knowledge. She decides to conceal a portion Z ≥ 0, and sends a message (Y – Z) to the 
authorities.  Her utility is Y-t (Y-Z) - τ1, where τ1 ≥ 0, is a transfer to the authorities. The 
auditor either learns Y, and therefore also Z, correctly or learns nothing at all. The probability 
that the auditor learns the true value of Y is p and is chosen by the principal. The auditor then 
sends a report that belongs to the set {Z,0} to the authorities, i.e., either stating the correct 
amount of evasion or certifying that no income has been concealed. The auditor’s utility is τ2 
≥ 0, which is a transfer from the authorities. The authority uses the auditor’s report to 
determine τ1 and τ2 and its utility is given by t(Y-Z) + τ1 - τ2. 
 
Consider the following time sequence. First the taxpayer learns Y privately and sends a 
message (Y-Z) and the auditor learns the true values of Y and Z with probability p. At the 
same time the taxpayer is informed of what the auditor has or has not learned.  Second, the 
authority offers the taxpayer and the auditor a contract, which announces p and specifies τ1 
and τ2  as functions of the messages sent by the taxpayer and the auditor. Third, the taxpayer 
and the auditor can sign a side contract that specifies a side transfer as a function of the 
messages. Fourth, contracts are implemented. 
 
If auditors and taxpayers can not collude, the third stage of the above game is deleted. In that 
case, the mechanism discussed at the end of section 2 is optimal for the authority; it offers the 
contract {τ1  = fZ; τ2  = RZ; R = f = t/p}. This contract incorporates sufficient disincentive for 
the taxpayer to either pay fines or bribe the auditor and for the auditor to take a bribe. 
However, if it is possible for the taxpayer and the auditor to get into a side contract, providing 
                                                     
7 Assuming a single taxpayer and auditor makes the interpretation of audit intensity somewhat contrived. We still use it 
because it makes the presentation of this section simple although we can scale up the model for many taxpayers without 
changing the conclusions of this section. 
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sufficient disincentive for the taxpayer and the auditor separately, as in this solution, becomes 
ineffective (Tirole, 1992). In the last section, we suggested that collusion is likely to emerge 
in repeated encounters so that the third stage of the above game can not be deleted. Therefore, 
we need to construct an optimal mechanism for the specified sequence. We use an insight 
from the optimal mechanism literature that if collusion is possible among agents, incentives 
need to be related to the aggregate performance of the potentially collusive group 
(Tirole,1986; Laffont, 1990). Since agents are linked through potential side contracting, 
incentives need to be extended to the level of this group. In the present case, we need to 
consider a mechanism that relates rewards to the aggregate performance of the potentially 
collusive group of taxpayers and auditors. 
 
 
5. A Possible Mechanism 
 
One measure of the aggregate performance of taxpayers and auditors together is the total 
income returned by the system. We propose a mechanism in which an m-level auditor is 
rewarded in proportion to the total income returned under her jurisdiction. The rate of the 
reward will be fixed so as to give an m-level auditor in a truth-revealing equilibrium the same 
income that she would have earned in a bribe chain.  
 
To develop this mechanism, we work out the bribe income of m-level auditors in a bribe 
chain with no reward for them (R =0). The following two restrictions rule out fine paying as 
an option for all auditors and taxpayers:  
 
pifi = bi-1,  for i = 2 to m.       (16) 
 p1f1 = t          (17) 
 
Conditions (16) can be stated in terms of pi’s and fi’s once we solve for the bi’s; thus, they can 
be used as elements of the contract provided by the authority. 
 
Equilibrium bribe rates are calculated, starting from level m, as: 
 





 bi = (fi + pi + 1bi+1)/2        (19)  
 
Using equations (19) and (16), we can solve for bi’s in terms of fi’s. Thus: 
bm-1 = ( fm-1  + pm bm ) / 2 = (fm-1  / 2) +(pm fm  / 4)  = (fm-1  / 2) +(bm-1  / 4).  
Therefore, 
 
 bm-1  = (2/3)fm-1        (20) 
  
By similar manipulation, we have: 
 
 bm-2 = (3/4)fm-2           (21)  
 
and, in general, 
 
bi  = [(m-i+1) / (m-i +2)] fi    for i = 1 to m     (22) 
 
Bribe rates given by (22) sustain a cheating equilibrium. The amount of bribe extracted by the 
j-th auditor at level i is p1  p2 ...pi bi Yij, where Yij, denotes the income of the taxpayers under 
the jurisdiction of this auditor through the chain of sub-auditors. The total bribe accruing to 
the k-th auditor at level m is p1 p2 ...pm bm Ymk. 
 
As suggested earlier, auditors at level m are to be offered a share of the income returned by 
taxpayers so that their incomes are invariant between a truth-revealing equilibrium and a 
bribe chain. Accordingly, each m-level auditor is offered a share s of income returned under 
her jurisdiction, where: 
 
 s = p1  p2 ...pm  bm 
    = (t / f1  )( b1  /f2 ) (b2   / f3 )(b3  /f4 )......(bi-1  /fi ) ......(bm-1  /fm ) (fm  /2) 
   = t(b1  /f1 ) (b2 /f2 )(b3  / f3 )......(bm-1  / fm-1  ). (1 /2) 
 = t [m/ (m+1)] [(m-1)/ m] [(m-2)/ (m-1)]....[2/3](1/2) 
= [t / (m+1)]         (23) 
 
Given this share, auditors at level m are indifferent between an income-revealing equilibrium 
and a bribe chain. Therefore, by assumption (6), they act honestly. An auditor at level (m-1) 
 12
would take a bribe only if it is affordable to pay fines when caught. Since this possibility is 
precluded by (16), they would not take a bribe from (m-2) level and so on.  Because 
taxpayers can not bribe, they will consider the option of fine payment, but find it precluded 
by condition (17). Thus, they report their incomes honestly.  
 
For later reference, we write out the restrictions on pi’s and fi’s that define the audit intensity-
fine- reward rule. In addition to (23), they comprise m conditions: 
 
 p1f1 = t          (17) 
 pifi = [(m-1)/(m-i+1)]fi-1, for i = 2 to m.     (24) 
 
Condition (24) uses (16) and (22) to eliminate bi’s and make a statement in terms of pi’s and 
fi’s only. Hence, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: If rewards are related to tax collection, it is possible to design income-
revealing equilibria sustainable over repeated audit encounters. 
 
Proposition 4: Such equilibria can be sustained by any value of m ≥ 1. As for Proposition 4, 
the proof follows obviously from the construction of the mechanism. 
 
We note that restrictions (17) and (24) determine only the authority’s share of tax revenue, (t-
s) uniquely, but not the 2m variables fi’s and pi’s. The m degrees of freedom may be utilised 
to maximize the revenue net of audit cost given by: 
 
 ∏ =  (t -s )y – {p1 Nc1 + p1 p2 Nc2  +......+ p1 p2 p3 ...pm Ncm}  (25) 
 
where, y is total income of all tax-payers,  N  is the number of tax-payers and ci is the unit 
audit cost at level i. Taking account of (23), we rewrite (25) as: 
 
 ∏ = [m/ (m +1)]ty –{ p1 Nc1 +p1 p2 Nc2  +...... + p1 p2 p3 ...pm Ncm} (26) 
 
For any given m, maximizing ∏ amounts to minimizing the expression {p1 Nc1 +p1 p2 Nc2 




The authority works in a political and institutional environment that sets upper limits to 
acceptable values of fi’s. Let the upper bound of fi = Fi for all i. Note from (17) and (24) that 
upper bounds on fi’s imply corresponding lower bounds for pi’s.  In that case, solving the m 
equations (17) and (24) for pi’s, after setting fi = Fi for all i, yields audit intensities that 
minimize audit cost for any given m.  We should remark that (17) and (24) may not have 
solutions for all arbitrary Fi’s>0 in view of the fact that 0< pi <1 for all pi. We are assuming 
that the exogenous upper bounds, Fi’s, belong to the set of solutions of (17) and (24). A 
sufficient condition for this is that the Fi’s increase with i. 
Proposition 5: For any m ≥ 1, equations (17), (24) and a further set of m equations fi = Fi,for 
i =1 to m, define fi’s, pi’s and s that sustain a truth-revealing equilibrium with maximum net 
revenue. Using these latter equations in (26), we can write the maximum net revenue as a 
function of m: 
 
∏*(m) = [m/ (m +1)]ty –{(m+1)c1/F1+ mc2/F2 + (m-1)c3/F3+……+ 3cm-1/Fm-1 +2cm/Fm} N
           (27) 
 
 
6. Net Revenue and a Possible Optimal Hierarchy 
 
We examine the role of m in determining the net revenue of the authority. For a given m, the 
maximum net revenue is given by (27). Suppose that the number of audit levels is increased 
from m-1 to m and that Δ∏*m-1,m denotes the resulting change in ∏*.  Then: 
 
Δ∏*m-1,m = [ ty/m(m+1)] – {c1/F1+ c2/F2 +…. … +cm-1/Fm-1 + 2cm/Fm} N (28) 
 
The first expression on the right side is the marginal increase in the authority’s share of tax 
revenues, which is positive but decreasing in m. The second expression is the marginal cost 
of adding another layer of auditing. If it exists, the optimal hierarchy, m, is achieved when the 
following inequality ceases to hold: 
 
 ty/m(m+1) > {c1/F1+ c2/F2 +…. … +cm-1/Fm-1 + 2cm/Fm} N    (29) 
 
A sufficient condition for an optimal m to exist is that the marginal audit cost should be non-
decreasing with m. Comparing the marginal cost for transiting from (m-1) to m with that for 
m to (m+1), this requires: 
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{c1/F1+ c2/F2 +…. … +cm-1/Fm-1+cm/Fm + 2cm+1/Fm+1}  ≥{c1/F1+ c2/F2 +…. … +cm-1/Fm-1 + 2cm/Fm}




2cm+1/Fm+1 ≥ cm/Fm        (31) 
 
Note that (31) does not imply that unit audit costs have to increase with m. Even when the 
sufficient conditions for solving (17) and (24), namely Fi>Fi-1 for all i, hold, an optimal m 
with unit audit costs falling is feasible. The intuitive explanation is that, as m increases, the 
corresponding optimal audit intensities at lower levels generally increase. Thus, an extra level 
of hierarchy adds to cost not only by creating a new level, but also by increasing the cost of 
all subordinate levels. The unit audit cost, cm, represents only the first component of this total 
cost increase. Therefore, even without increasing unit audit costs, marginal cost can increase 
fast enough to yield a maximal m. Thus, the condition for the existence of an optimal 
hierarchy is not very restrictive. 
 
Proposition 6: An optimal m exists for an information-revealing and sustainable equilibrium 
without bribes under a set of sufficient conditions that are not very restrictive.  
 
 
7. Concluding Observations 
 
Propositions 1 through 6 constitute the results; we conclude with an intuitive summary. If 
rewards are linked to detection, auditors are rewarded only as long as taxpayers evade taxes. 
If a mechanism is successful, tax evasion stops and so do the rewards. Auditors then find that 
they would be better off by allowing evasion to take place and accepting bribes. Thus, 
auditors have an incentive to undermine the reward mechanism by taking bribes at a rate that 
makes tax evasion feasible, i.e., at a rate lower than the reward. In effect, the reward is 
ignored. 
 
The situation changes when rewards are tied to tax revenues. If the reward is no less than the 
auditors’ share in the cheating equilibrium, auditors are no worse off when they enforce an 
income-revealing equilibrium. The authority can use this possibility to reduce the total 
reward money offered to auditors within this sort of mechanism.  This reduction is achieved 
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by increasing the number of levels in the audit hierarchy.  In a cheating equilibrium, the bribe 
of an auditor falls as she is further away from the taxpayer. Therefore, it costs the government 
less to compensate a higher layer of auditors for not taking bribes than a lower layer. Of 
course, this consideration has to be weighed against the additional cost of another layer of 
auditing. Given the income of taxpayers, the government’s share increases with the audit 
level but at a diminishing rate. Furthermore, audit cost increases as audit levels increase. We 
can determine an optimal audit level if the marginal increase in audit cost is no less than the 
marginal increase in government’s share as audit level increases.  
 
The condition for the existence of an optimal m has two components. First, it is necessary that 
there exist net revenue maximizing audit intensities for any given m. Second, condition (31) 
should hold ensuring that if revenue maximizing audit intensity exists for all values of m, 
then there is an optimal value of m. Condition (31) does not appear very restrictive. However, 
the sufficient condition for the existence of optimal audit intensity for any given m, namely 
that permissible upper bounds of fine rates increase with m, may prove restrictive. There are 
two reasons for concern. First, there may be an upper limit for all acceptable fine rates in any 
given political and institutional environment. Second, these fines may be contestable in a 
court of law and contingent on conviction. In that case, effective fine rates are different from 
Fi’s and they may not necessarily be increasing in m. 
 
The basic intuition used in this paper is borrowed from the literature on optimal mechanism 
design. The central result is that, in potentially collusive situations, the principal should 
devise a contract based on the aggregate performance of the potentially collusive group and 
not on anyone’s individual performance. In the present context, a measure of aggregate 
performance of the collusive group of taxpayers and auditors is the total tax returned. In 
future research, this idea can be pursued in modelling several other forms of collusive 






Acharya, Shankar N. (1986) Aspects of the Black Economy of India: Report Submitted to the 
Ministry of Finance, Government of India. New Delhi, India: National Institute of 
Public Finance and Policy. 
 
Allingham, Michael G. and Sandmo, Agnar (1972) Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis.  Journal of Public Economics. 1, 3/4, 323-338. 
 
Anant, T. C. A., Mukherji, Badal, and Basu, Kaushik (1990) Bargaining without Convexity: 
Generalizing the Kalai- Smorodinsky Solution.  Economics Letters. 33, 2, 115-119.  
 
Bac, Mehmet (1996) Corruption, Supervision and the Structure of Hierarchies. Journal of Law 
Economics and Organization. 12, 2, 277-298. 
 
Bac, Mehmet (1996) Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies. Journal of Comparative 
Economics. 22, 2, 99-118. 
 
Bag, Parimal Kanti (1997) Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies. Journal of Comparative 
Economics.  25, 3, 322-344. 
 
Basu, Kaushik., Bhattacharya, Sudipto, and Mishra, Ajit (1992) A Note on Bribery and the 
Control of Corruption.  Journal of Public Economics.  48, 3, 349-59. 
 
Braudel, Fernand (1983) The Wheels of Commerce. London , U.K.: Book Club Associates. 
 
Chander, Parkash, and Wilde, Louis (1992) Corruption in Tax Administration. Journal of 
Public Economics.  49, 3, 333-349. 
 
Chu, C. Y. Cyrus (1990) Income Tax Evasion with Venal Tax Officials - The Case of Taiwan. 
Public Finance.  45, 3, 392-408. 
 
Goswami, Omkar., Sanyal, Amal, and Gang, Ira N. (1991) Taxes, Corruption and Bribes: A 
Model of Indian Public Finance. In Roemer, Michael, and Jones Christine, Ed., Markets 
in Developing Countries: Parallel, Fragmented, and Black. pp 201-213, 252-253. San 
Francisco, CA: ICS Press. 
 
Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1990) Analysis of Hidden Gaming in Three Level Hierarchy. Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization. 6, 2: 301-24. 
 
Palmier, Leslie H. (1983) Bureaucratic Corruption and its remedies. In Clarke, Michael, Ed., 
Corruption- Causes, Consequences and Control, 207-219. London, U.K: Frances Pinter.  
 
Sanyal, Amal., Gang, Ira N, and Goswami, Omkar. Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer 
Curve. Public Choice, forthcoming. 
 
Srinivasan, T.N. (1973) Tax Evasion: A Model. Journal of Public Economics, 2, 4: 339-346. 
 
 17
Swart, Koenraad W. (1980) Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century. Utrecht : H & S 
Publishers. 
 
The Policy Group, Estimates of Tax Collection and Evasion in Response to the 1985-86 
Budget. New Delhi: The Policy Group, 1985. 
 
Theobald, Robin (1990) Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment. Durham, N.C: 
Duke University Press. 
 
Tirole, Jean (1986) Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 2, 2, 181-214. 
 
Tirole, Jean (1992) Collusion and the Theory of Organizations in Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Ed., 
Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress, Vol. II. Econometric Society 
Monographs, No.21, pp 151-206. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Virmani, Arvind (1987) Tax Evasion, Corruption and Administration: Monitoring the People’s 
Agents under Symmetric Dishonesty. Development Research Division Discussion 
Paper No. 271. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
 
Wade, Robert (1988) Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South 










    evade                 not evade 
        1           1      
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Figure 1:  
Extensive Form of the Game of Section 2 
[n.a = no action] 
